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II. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction of an 
appeal from an order of the Board of Natural Resources pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2(3)(e)(iv) (1989). 
III. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
This appeal includes the Appellant or Petitioner, Sam 
Oil, Inc., which shall be referred to as "Sam Oil" or its alter 
ego and owner, Steven A. Malnar, "Malnar"; the Respondent, BHP 
Petroleum (Americas), Inc., which shall be referred to as "BHP"; 
and the Respondent, Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, of the Utah 
Division of Oil, Gas and Mining, which shall be referred to as 
the "Board." 
A hearing was held before the Board on August 24, 1989, 
and the transcript of that hearing shall be referred to as "TR" 
followed by references to pages such as "TR 34". 
All references to the designated Record will be cited 
as "R" followed by the page number of the Record such as "R-034". 
The hearing before the Board dealt with three 
documents, (i) the Roosevelt Unit Agreement dated November 7, 
1950, which will be referred to as the "Unit Agreement"; (ii) the 
Operating Agreement for the Roosevelt Unit Area dated March 15, 
1951, which will be referred to as the "Operating Agreement"; and 
(iii) the Amendment to the Operating Agreement dated April 27, 
1983, which will be referred to as the "Amendment". It is 
uncontroverted that all of these documents are legally executed, 
valid and binding. 
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The "Non-consent" penalty within the Operating 
Agreement, is a standard provision utilized industry wide which 
imposes a charge or penalty against any party who's money or 
investment is not accounted for at the inception of the drilling 
of the oil and gas well and thus, does not incur the extreme 
risks attendant to the drilling of a well. 
The Roosevelt Unit itself will be referred to as the 
"Unit", what is known as a "federal" unit comprised of federal, 
state and fee petroleum properties which are unitized under 
federal law for the purposes of orderly and efficient 
administration of unitized land and protection of correlative 
rights. 
The hearing also dealt with the Roosevelt Unit #6 Well 
which will be referred to as the "#6 Well". 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Should the Court accept the findings of fact of the 
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining as being supported by "substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
Court"? 
The standard of appellate review is set forth in the 
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. SS 63-46b-l to 22 
(1989). Section 63-46b-16(4) (1989) states: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant 
relief only if, on the basis of the agencyfs 
record, it determines that a person seeking 
judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; • • . . 
B. Should the Court should give deference to the 
conclusions of the Board based on the Boardfs findings of facts, 
that there are no special or equitable circumstances which would 
excuse Sam Oil from being subject to all the terms of the 
Amendment to the Roosevelt Unit Operating Agreement, including 
the nonconsent penalty? 
The Administrative Procedures Act has been reviewed by 
the Court most recently in the case of First National Bank of 
Boston v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 
P.2d 1156 (1990), where "substantial evidence" under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989) was defined as ". . . that quantum 
and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a 
reasonable mind to support a conclusion." 799 P.2d 1156, 1165. 
See also Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 
(Utah Ct.App. 1989). 
C. Should the Court rely on the Boardfs expertise in 
oil and gas matters in order to interpret the scope of the Unit 
Agreement, the Operating Agreement and the Amendment, and their 
applicability to Sam Oil? 
In the case of Utah Department of Administrative 
Services v. Public Service Commission9 658 P.2d 601 (1983), the 
Court explained that factual questions sometimes lead to 
determinations of "special law", which, by their very nature, 
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require the expertise of the agency empowered by the legislature 
to make such decisions. The Court in reviewing such findings of 
special laws, held that considerable weight should be given to 
such findings. 
Also among these intermediate issues are 
the Commission's decisions on what can be 
called "special law." These are the 
Commission's interpretations of the operative 
provisions of the statutory law it is 
empowered to administer, especially those 
generalized terms that bespeak a legislative 
intent to delegate their interpretation to 
the responsible agency. In reviewing agency 
decisions of this type, we apply what we have 
called the "time honored rule of law . . . 
that the construction of statutes by 
governmental agencies charged with their 
administration should be given considerable 
weight . . . ." 
658 P.2d 601, at page 610, citing McPhie v. Industrial 
Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977); West Jordan v. 
Department of Employment Security, 656 P.2d 411 (Utah 1982). 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a matter which was 
brought by Sam Oil, Inc. as petitioner before the Utah State 
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9 
(1988), for an accounting as to oil and gas revenues allegedly 
due from BHP Petroleum (Americas), Inc., the operator of the 
Roosevelt Unit, a federally approved oil and gas unit covering 
Indian lands and fee lands located in Uintah County, Utah. The 
relationship among the leaseholders and royalty or mineral 
interest owners who hold interests within the boundaries of the 
Unit is described in three agreements: The Unit Agreement which 
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was executed November 7, 1950 (R-0242), the Unit Operating 
Agreement dated March 15, 1951 (R-0252), and the Amendment to the 
Operating Agreement dated April 27, 1983 (R-0278). Sam Oil is 
the lessee, among others, of an oil and gas lease covering the 
S^NE^ of Section 19, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Uintah 
Special Meridian, dated as of August 29, 1983, but executed and 
acknowledged on November 2, 1983 (the "Lease") (R-0297), which 
was obtained from a fee mineral interest owner of land within the 
Unit, Hazel Robertson. (Hazel Robertson has not participated in 
nor is she a party to the Board hearing or this appeal.) The 
Lease was obtained after drilling on the #6 Well had commenced. 
(Emphasis added.) (TR 49) Both Sam Oil and Hazel Robertson 
joined the Unit after the Well was completed, tested and shown to 
be a substantial producer, and ready for production. (R-0004) 
BHP is the current operator of the deep rights in the Unit, which 
includes the #6 Well, located the SW^SW^ of Section 20, Township 
1 South, Range 1 East, Uintah Special Meridian. 
The issue before the Board was whether Sam Oil is 
subject to the nonconsent provision contained in the Amendment 
which requires the operator of the Well to recoup 300% of Sam 
Oil's share of the drilling and completion costs of the Well 
before Sam Oil can share in the revenue. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. The 
Board, after considering all of the evidence offered at a hearing 
in the matter on August 25, 1989, found that substantial evidence 
existed in the record as a whole to support its findings and 
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ordered that Sam Oil was subject to the Amendment and could not 
participate in the revenues in the #6 Well until 300% of its 
share of the drilling and completion costs had been recouped by 
other working interest owners from production. (R-0446; Addendum 
A) The Petition seeking an accounting was dismissed because no 
payments were due until the 300% penalty had been recouped from 
the #6 Well. (BHP has provided to Sam Oil on a continuing basis 
payout statements showing revenues, costs or expenses, and the 
remaining nonconsent balance left to be recouped.) On February 
16, 1990, Sam Oil filed a Petition for Rehearing, and a hearing 
on the Petition for Rehearing was held on March 22, 1990. On 
June 8, 1990, the Board issued an Order denying the Petition for 
Rehearing. (R-0444; Addendum B) Sam Oil Sam Oil has appealed to 
the Court seeking review of the Board's Orders. 
VI. SUMMARY OR ARGUMENTS 
A. The Court should not disturb the findings of the 
Board since the findings were adequately supported by substantial 
evidence as set forth in the Record. Sam Oil is attempting to 
avoid its contractual obligations to pay its fair share of the 
drilling and completion costs of the #6 Well while, at the same 
time, failing or refusing to place its investment or monies at 
risk in the Well's drilling. There is nothing in the Record to 
support Sam Oil's contention that an exception should made in its 
favor to the detriment of the other working interest owners in 
the Unit. 
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B. The legal conclusion of the Board that Sam Oil 
should be bound by the terms of the Amendment and the nonconsent 
penalty is based on actual findings of the Board which is based 
upon the evidence and testimony of the parties. The "findings" 
set forth by Sam Oil were not reached by the Board in making its 
decision; the actual findings were sufficient as a matter of law 
to make its legal conclusions. 
C. The record as a whole supports the findings of the 
Board that Sam Oil should be subject to the nonconsent penalties 
contained in the Amendment to the Unit Operating Agreement. 
D. The Board consists of highly qualified members who 
have experience in oil and gas matters. The Court should give 
weight to the expertise of the Board in reviewing its findings. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. THE COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE BOARD'S FINDINGS OF 
FACT BECAUSE THE RECORD SUPPORTS THOSE FINDINGS. 
1. The Standard for Review is "Substantial 
Evidence. 
This Court recently established standards to be 
utilized in the review of findings of fact and conclusions of law 
by the an administrative agency. In First National Bank of 
Boston v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 
P.2d 1156 (1990), the Court stated that the Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. SS 63-46b-l to 22 (1989), requires 
the 
. . . appellate court to review the Mwhole 
record" to determine whether the agencyfs 
action is "supported by "substantial 
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evidence." "Substantial evidence" is that 
quantum and quality of relevant evidence that 
is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to 
support a conclusion. See Console v. FMC, 
383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026-27, 16 
L.Ed.2d 131 (1966); Idaho State Ins. Fund v. 
Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 
930-31 (1985); Grace Drilling v. Board of 
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). 
An appellate court applying the "substantial 
evidence test" must consider both the 
evidence that supports the Tax Commission's 
factual findings and the evidence that 
detracts from the findings. Nevertheless, 
the party challenging the findings—in this 
case, the taxpayer—must marshal all of the 
evidence supporting the findings and show 
that despite the supporting facts, the Tax 
Commission's findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence. 799 P.2d 1156, 1165. 
The case before the Court is essentially a factual 
case, and the Court is being asked to review factual 
determinations made by the Board which lead to a legal conclusion 
that Sam Oil is subject to the terms and conditions of a contract 
(the Unit Agreement), in which it voluntarily joined. There was 
nothing before the Board concerning the interpretation of the 
terms of Unit Agreement, the Operating Agreement or the 
Amendment. These Agreements and their terms and conditions are 
uncontroverted. The nonconsent provision is not at dispute and 
its meaning is clear: If Sam Oil doesnft participate in the 
drilling of a well, the operator must recoup 300% of its share of 
the drilling and completion costs of that well before it can 
participate in the production attributable to its interest. 
2. The Review of Evidence is not a Trial de Novo. 
In reviewing the findings of the Board, the Court 
should not substitute its own conclusions it might have reached 
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had it been the original trier of fact. In Grace Drilling v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct.App. 1989), the court said: 
In undertaking such a review, this court 
will not substitute its judgment as between 
two reasonably conflicting views, even though 
we may have come to a different conclusion 
had the case come before us for de novo 
review. [Citations omitted]. It is the 
province of the Board, not appellate courts, 
to resolve conflicting evidence, and where 
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the 
same evidence, it is for the Board to draw 
the inferences. 776 P.2d 63, 68. 
B. THE BOARD HAD SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BEFORE IT IN 
REACHING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
The Order of the Board dated April 25, 1990, lists 14 
Findings of Fact. Sam Oil listed the "findings of fact" in its 
brief on pages 1 and 2. Of the six "findings" listed, only 
findings (i), (ii) and (iv) were actual findings of the Board. 
Sam Oil goes on in its brief and attempts to show that there was 
insufficient evidence to support "findings" (iii), (v) and (vi) 
which, as stated, were not Board findings at all. By elevating 
assumptions of fact to findings of fact, Sam Oil then attempted 
show why the Board's ultimate finding of law was unwarranted. 
For example, according to Sam Oil, on page 2 of its Brief, 
"finding" (v) provides: 
Sam Oil delayed and did not elect to 
participate in the #6 Well until it signed 
the joinder documents in February 1984 after 
the Well had been completed and Sam Oil had 
known that the Well was a "good" well. 
It is true that the Board found that the #6 Well was 
completed on January 6, 1984, as a "good" well and that on 
February 15, 1984, Sam Oil mailed the ratification and joinder 
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documents to the Unit operator, Rio Bravo Oil Company. (R-0449) 
But in reaching its conclusions, the testimony of Mr. Malnar gave 
the the Board reason to believe that Sam Oil was riding the well 
down free of charge to see if it were good before joining. There 
was testimony to the effect that he had knowledge of the #6 Well 
and that he was watching it very closely. 
Q. At the time you signed the ratification documents— 
and that was around February 15, 198[4]—did you know 
whether the Wasatch No. 6 Well had reached total depth? 
A. [By Mr. Malnar] Yes. In February I knew that it 
had been— 
Q. Did you have any knowledge regarding what the 
results of the drilling were? 
A. Not at that time. All I know was that they said it 
was a good well, because by then I had been dealing 
with a phone caller to the Denver office, and I think 
it was Dan Kropp said that the well was—looked like it 
was going to be good. (TR 58) 
To the extent that Sam attempts in its brief to 
undermine the Board's findings which it didn't make, this Court 
should disregard Sam's argument. Taken as a whole, the 
testimony, the exhibits and the legal arguments presented before 
the Board allowed it to come to the critical legal conclusion 
which is the central issue on appeal. For example, Finding No. 3 
of the Board states: 
3. Prior to the commencement of drilling the 
#6 Well, Sam Oil knew of the existence of the 
unleased interest of Robertson. (R-0448) 
This Finding is supported by Mr. Malnarfs testimony 
where he stated that he ran " . . . across this unleased acreage. 
It was kind of an accident." (TR 50) Later in his testimony he 
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admitted that he didn't obtain the lease from Hazel Robertson 
until September, but that he back dated the lease to August 29th. 
Q. Why didn't you pick August 15? 
A. [By Mr. Malnar] I don't know. I just—that is the 
day that was picked. 
Q. Why not May, the first date you found out about the 
lease? 
A. We could have done that, too, because I did not 
know for sure when the well spudded. (TR 85) 
Finding No. 4 of the Board was also supported by Mr. 
Malnar's testimony. 
4. Sam Oil knew prior to the commencement of 
drilling that the #6 Well would be drilled as 
a Wasatch deep formation well. (R-0448) 
Mr. Malnar contacted Hazel Robertson sometime in the 
middle the month of September, 1983, and the #6 Well was spudded 
on September 11, 1983. (TR 80-82) He then testified that he had 
learned about "deep wells" prior to that. 
A. I believe Don Johnson told me prior to this that 
there was a possibility of some deep wells being 
drilled in the Roosevelt Unit. 
Q. Oh. So you may have known of this well prior to 
the rigup? 
A. I didn't know where it was going to be. There were 
other wells drilling, too, that were shallow holes. I 
had no idea. (TR 81-82) 
Admittedly, Mr. Malnar has changed his testimony from 
time to time, and it has been difficult to pinpoint the exact 
moment he became aware of the depth planned for the #6 Well. In 
his Affidavit filed in support of the Motion for Rehearing, Mr. 
Malnar claims that his conversation with Johnson was on October 
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10, 1983. (R-095) But in his letter to Phillips Petroleum dated 
October 6, 1983, he proposes some "possible deep well ventures." 
(R-0138) So with at least three versions as to when he learned 
of the plans for the deep well, coupled with his testimony that 
he discovered the Hazel Robertson acreage in May, 1983, the Board 
certainly had "substantial evidence" to make its finding. Proper 
procedure would have been for Sam Oil to lease the Robertson 
acreage in May of 1983, and to submit a joinder to the Unit. By 
executing ratification and joinder documents after the #6 Well 
was drilled, completed, and shown to be a significant producer, 
Sam Oil attempted to avoid all of the risks, while at the same 
time, enjoying all of the rewards. 
C. THE COURT SHOULD GIVE DEFERENCE TO THE BOARD'S 
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON ITS FINDINGS OF FACTS. 
1. The Board's Expertise is Needed under S 40-6-9 
to Make the Findings in this Case, 
In First National Bank of Boston v. County Board of 
Equalization of Salt Lake County, supra, the Court recognized 
that the expertise of the administrative agencies must be 
considered by the appellate court. The expertise, howeverf must 
be applied in a manner consistent with the agency's legislative 
mandate. 
Although it is a "universally recognized 
rule" that this court must "take some 
cognizance of the expertise of the agency in 
its particular field and accordingly to give 
some deference to its determination/' Utah 
Power & Light Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 590 
P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979), the agency's 
decision must rest upon some sound 
evidentiary basis, not a creation of fiat. 
799 P.2d 1156, 1166. 
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The Utah State Legislature has empowered the Board to 
determine whether parties entitled to proceeds from oil and gas 
wells are receiving those payments. Utah Code Ann. S 40-6-9 
(1988). In making this determination in the case of Sam Oil, the 
Board heard extensive testimony, examined a multitude of exhibits 
submitted by the parties, and heard arguments of counsel from 
both parties. Based on these factors, the Board made factual 
findings and conclusions of law, which rested on a "sound 
evidentiary basis." 
See also Utah Department of Administrative Services v. PuJblic 
Service Commission, supra, where this Court said: 
In reviewing decisions such as these, a court 
should afford great deference to the 
technical expertise or more extensive 
experience of the responsible agency. 658 
P.2d 601, 610. 
The members of the Board come from a cross section of 
interests and backgrounds. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-4(2) (1983) 
provides: 
2. The board shall then consist of seven 
members appointed by the governor, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate. No more 
than four members shall be from the same 
political party. The members shall have the 
following qualifications: 
(a) two members knowledgeable in mining 
matters; 
(b) two members knowledgeable in oil and gas 
matters; 
(c) two members knowledgeable in ecological 
and environmental matters; 
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(d) one member who is a private land owner, 
owns a mineral or royalty interest and is 
knowledgeable in those interests; and 
(e) one member who is knowledgeable in 
geological matters. 
Each of these individuals has been chosen to give the 
Board the necessary breadth of experience to review natural 
resource matters. Because of the experience of the Board and 
its understanding of the complexities of unitization agreements, 
we would urge this Court to give deference to the Boardfs 
findings which have been amply supported by the record. 
2. The Board's Legal Conclusion was Supported by 
the Record as a Whole. 
The central finding of the Board is its Conclusion of 
Law No. 4 which provides as follows: 
4. As a rule, under the Unit Agreement and 
Unit Operating Agreement, as amended, the 
lessee of an uncommitted interest who commits 
that interest to the unit subsequent to the 
commencement of the well, would be subject to 
the nonconsent penalty provided in the Unit 
Operating Agreement, as amended. However, 
there may be unique circumstances where, as a 
matter of equity, the general rule would not 
apply. The Board does not find such 
circumstances to exist in this case. 
Consequently, Sam Oil is subject to the 300% 
nonconsent penalty provided in the Unit 
Operating Agreement, as amended. (Emphasis 
added). (R-0451) 
There are adequate facts in the transcript alone to 
support the Board's legal conclusion that this case did not call 
for equity: 
a. Mr. Malnar knew as early as May that there was 
uncommitted acreage which could be leased and he believed that 
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the entire Roosevelt Unit was a "sweet spot", not risky for the 
drilling of wells. (TR 49-50). 
b. He convinced Hazel Robertson to lease her land on 
the basis that there was a deep well being drilled, and back 
dated the lease prior to the spudding date. (TR 49) (In effect, 
by leasing from her, he obtained 7/8ths of the production and 
left her with l/8th, even though he did not participate in the 
drilling of the well. Had he not taken the lease, Hazel 
Robertson would have had the opportunity to either participate in 
the well or wait for a 300% payout and then receive 8/8ths of her 
interest.) 
c. He agreed that he is bound by the terms of the Unit 
Agreement. (TR 91) 
d. His expert witness, Phillip Lear, testified that at 
a certain point the risk has been borne by the participants and 
it isn't fair to let someone else in. (TR 130). 
e. His expert also testified that there is a basis for 
difference of opinion as to when the penalty should apply when no 
notice is given. (TR 139). 
f. Finally, his expert testified that the operator of 
the Unit could be forced to pay revenues twice if the nonconsent 
penalty were not imposed. (TR 141) . 
g. There was testimony that BHP made good faith 
efforts to locate and notify Hazel Robertson. (TR 164; 167; 205-
209) 
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h. There was testimony that there was no delay in 
responding to Sam Oil by BHP. (TR 170) 
i. There was evidence that Mr. Malnar was sent copies 
of Unit Agreement and Amendment had been sent to Mr. Malnar. 
(TR 179) 
j. There was evidence and testimony that Sam Oil's 
execution of the ratification and joinder documents to the Unit 
ocurred after the #6 Well was drilled and completed. (TR 58) 
k. There was evidence that an official of the 
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Mr. Ed 
Guynn had recommended the imposition of the 300% penalty. (TR 
188) 
1. There was testimony to the effect that if Sam Oil 
had been allowed to participate after spudding he wouldn't have 
been at risk. (TR 195) 
m. Finally, there was testimony that a 300% nonconsent 
penalty is reasonable for the risks taken in the drilling of a 
deep well in the Unit. (TR 225). 
Based on the total universe of facts presented to the 
Board, the opportunity of the Board to observe the demeanor of 
the witnesses, and the Board's expertise in the effect of 
unitization agreements, a legal finding was made that there were 
no equitable reasons why the provisions of the nonconsent penalty 
shouldn't apply. BHP submits that this finding should receive 
"considerable weight." 
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D. LEGAL AUTHORITIES WHEN READ IN THE LIGHT OF CUSTOM 
IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY SUPPORT THE ASSESSMENT OF THE 300% 
PENALTY PRIOR TO ALLOWING SAM OIL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE #6 WELL. 
1. Custom in the Oil and Gas Industry Dictates 
the Imposition of a Nonconsent Penalty. 
Before examining the cases cited by Sam Oil, it would 
be helpful to review some of the factors and customs that drive 
the oil and gas business. There are several realities in the oil 
business which influence the weight of the testimony and evidence 
presented before the Board. 
First, most drilling tracts are owned by multiple 
mineral interest owners or lessees of that interest, and 
generally, only one well is permitted to produce the oil which 
will adequately drain a designated area. The Bureau of Land 
Management, if the land is in a federal unit, or the Division of 
Oil, Gas and Mining, if it is a fee or state unit, decides where 
the well can be drilled. That decision defines which mineral 
interest owners are included within the drilling unit. (A 
drilling unit under federal jurisdiction is called a 
"participating area" within a unitized area and can include many 
wells and large acreage tracts; by contrast, under Utah State 
law, a drilling unit contains a prescribed amount of acreage 
which has been "spaced" or defined by the Board and is limited to 
two producing wells. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 [1988]). 
Second, because drilling an oil well is an 
extraordinarily expensive, risky project, it is in the best 
interests of the drilling party (the operator in most cases) to 
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include as many parties in the sharing of the risk and the 
expenses. If an interest owner does not wish to take the risk 
and not make capital contributions, that owner is deemed to be a 
nonconsenting owner and does not participate in the drilling, 
testing or completing of the well. By not sharing the risk with 
the operator and other consenting owners, he is charged a 
••penalty" of a percentage of the cost to drill and complete the 
well which is recouped from production. At such time as the 
penalty is recouped (penalties range from 200% to 1000% with 300% 
being common in the industry and is the amount provided in the 
Amendment to the Operating Agreement), the interest owner begins 
to receive his share of the production less expenses. 
In the case before the Court, Sam is characterizing 
BHP's inability to find and notify Hazel Robertson about the #6 
Well as an attempt to assess the nonconsent penalty. In fact, 
most of Samfs brief focuses on notice and opportunity to join. 
Because of the highly speculative nature of the oil business, no 
prudent operator would drill a well depending on the nonconsent 
penalty to finance the project. If the well is a dry hole, or if 
it fails to pay out 100% of the costs, then the operator has lost 
its investment and gets nothing from the Sam Oils of the world. 
It doesn't make sense to take on the risk of drilling a well, 
paying 100% of the costs, and then, at payout, contact the other 
owners and let them participate without any penalty. If that 
were the law there would never be any oil produced in this State 
unless the operator controlled 100% of the mineral rights. Sam 
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Oil totally ignors its actions and does not explain its complete 
failure to put its money at risk. 
2. The Unit Agreement and the Amendment to the 
Operating Agreement Require the Imposition of a Nonconsent 
Penalty. 
The rules for participating in a well in the Roosevelt 
Unit are spelled out in paragraph 27 of the Roosevelt Unit 
Agreement. (R-0242) When the Unit was formed, the parties to 
the agreement had to demonstrate to the Secretary of the Interior 
that they held " . . . sufficient interests in the Roosevelt Unit 
Area covering the land hereinafter described to give reasonably 
effective control of operations therein; . . . ." (R-0242) 
Under current regulations all parties must have the opportunity 
to join. 
The owners of any right, title, or interest 
in the oil and gas deposits to be unitized 
are regarded as proper parties to a proposed 
agreement. All such parties must be invited 
to join the agreement. If any party fails or 
refuses to join the agreement, the proponent 
of the agreement, at the time it is filed for 
approval, must submit evidence of reasonable 
effort made to obtain joinder of such party 
and, when requested, the reasons for such 
nonjoinders. 43 CFR § 3181.3 
Since the date the Unit was formed in 1950, all of the 
interest owners and any other nonjoinders in the Unit area have 
had a continuing opportunity to join the Unit. For whatever 
reason, the holder of the J. R. Robertson interest (now owned by 
Hazel Robertson) chose not to join the Unit. Being in the Unit 
means that the participants within a participating area share in 
-19-
the oil and gas production according to their proportionate share 
of mineral interest in their acreage, divided by the total number 
of acres in the participating area. A member of the Unit shares 
in all of the production in the participating area. This is true 
even if the producing well happens to be located on the property 
owned by the Unit member. Hence, one could gamble and not join a 
unit and hope that a well will someday be drilled on his 
property. Or, he can take a more conservative approach, join the 
unit and participate in a lesser degree in all of the unit wells 
with the hope that the total production will eventually be equal 
to or greater than the production which might have been realized 
from a well on his tract. 
In the case before the Court, the #6 Well is located 
off the Hazel Robertson property. Hence, the only way she and 
Sam Oil were able to share in the proceeds of the Unit was to 
join the Unit. It is conjecture to speculate as to why the 
Robertson interest had not joined the Unit prior to 1984 even 
though the Unit has been in existence since 1950. (As a royalty 
owner, Hazel Robertson is not at risk; as such, she has been 
receiving royalty payments since her joinder.) Mr. Malnar has 
known about the Unit long before the #6 Well was drilled (TR 73, 
85) Sam Oil waited to see if the #6 Well would be a producer and 
then he attempted to create, in retrospect, a series of events 
that would somehow show that Mr. Malnar wanted to pay his share 
of drilling expenses and participate in the well but was denied 
the opportunity to do so. The Board determined that Sam Oil had 
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knowledge and the opportunity to join the Unit but never acted 
upon it. 
Once Sam Oil and Hazel Robertson made a decision to 
join the Unit, they were permitted to do so in accordance with 
the provisions of Paragraph 27 of the Unit Agreement. The offer 
to join the Unit had been on the table for thirty-four years when 
the holders of the J. R. Robertson interest decided to accept. 
Sam Oil, however, believes that there is a continuing obligation 
to search out nonjoinders and reiterate the offer to join. He 
could cite nothing to substantiate that position, and indeed, 
case law is to the contrary. 
3. Case Law Supports the Imposition of a 
Nonconsent Penalty. 
Cases cited by Sam Oil support the Board's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. For example, the court in 
California Company v. Britt, 154 So.2d 144 (Miss. 1963), said: 
Owners of royalty or unleased mineral 
interests are entitled to come into a 
unitization program under fair, reasonable, 
and equitable terms with other participants 
in the unit, similarly situated. 154 So.2d 
144, 150. 
The Board found no equitable considerations which would 
have authorized it to abandon the contractual conditions set 
forth in the Unit Agreement and allow Sam Oil to join the Unit 
but to ignore the penalty provisions called for under the 
Amendment of the Operating Agreement. The test set forth in 
California Company v. Britt, calls for terms which are fair and 
similar to those terms which would be applied to any other 
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similarly situated party. It is not fair and equitable to force 
those parties who have previously joined the unit to bear the 
risk of participating in the #6 Well and then turn around and 
allow Sam Oil to avoid the penalty for sitting on the sidelines 
while waiting for the Well to be drilled. Sam Oil's brief 
emphasizes his alleged desire to get into the Unit prior to the 
completion of the Well. The record shows, however, that Sam knew 
that the interest of Hazel Robertson was unleased for five months 
before the Well was commenced. (TR 85) Indeed, his motivation 
for obtaining the lease was the knowledge that the Well had 
commenced. Once the operator has committed for the drilling rig 
and the rig has been mobilized, the participants1 money is at 
risk. Each day that drilling continues, more money is spent and 
it is gone until production is obtained and marketed. Even if 
Sam Oil had ratified the Unit on the day after the Well was 
spudded, it still would have been subject to the nonconsent 
penalties assessed under the Operating Agreement and the 
Amendment. Once the Unit has been formed, notice is no longer a 
factor, and the contractual provisions of the Unit Agreement, the 
Operating Agreement and the Amendment take over. 
Sam Oil also cites the case of Boggess v. Milam, 34 
S.E. 2d 267 (W. Va. 1945), for the proposition that BHP had an 
obligation to contact Sam Oil prior to the drilling of the #6 
Well and offer it an opportunity to join the Unit. Like 
California Company v. Britt case, Boggess v. Milam supports the 
decision of the Board. In Boggess, the nonjoining party held 
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acreage off of the drilling site, as is the case before the 
Court. Boggess, like Sam Oil, sought to have the court apply 
equitable principles in order to obtain an interest in production 
off of his leased tract. The court said: 
We have been unable to find a case in which, 
with no contractual obligation to be 
considered, the owner of land has been held 
to have an interest, legal or equitable, in 
the oil and gas underlying adjoining or 
adjacent lands in which he holds no title. 
34 S.E. 2d 267, 269. 
And yet, Sam Oil would have this Court apply equitable 
principles to make an exception to the rules established by the 
Unit Operating Agreement, and excuse the nonconsent charges 
assessed it so that Sam can participate without penalty in the #6 
Well located off of its leased tract. The court went on to hold 
that 
. . . a tenant in common, particularly one 
holding a minor interest in the oil and gas, 
is not to be allowed, by withholding his 
consent to the development of the boundary in 
which his interest lies, to prevent the 
development of an adjoining tract under a 
unitization agreement to which he has been an 
equal opportunity to become a party and in 
which his cotenants have all joined. 34 S.E. 
2d 267, 271. 
Sam Oil asserts that this holding supports its theory 
that Hazel Robertson should have been notified prior to the 
drilling of the #6 Well, and that because she wasnft notified, 
Sam Oil can assume her position and claim that it received no 
notice. This, in spite of the fact the Samfs president and alter 
ego, Steven Malnar, knew about the unleased interest and the 
possibility of the Well long before he obtained the lease from 
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Hazel Robertson. Malnar also testified that he back-dated the 
lease to the date that the drilling of the Well commenced, even 
though it was actually executed some three or four weeks after 
drilling began. (TR 85) As stated above, the Robertson interest 
has had ample opportunity for joinder, and the holders of that 
interest had, prior to 1984, decided not to join. 
There was no obligation on the part of BHP or any other 
operator to notify nonjoinders about the contemplated well. 
Nevertheless, BHP made efforts to find Mrs. Robertson because it 
was in its best interests to have as many parties as possible 
participate in the venture. The fact that BHP was not able to 
find her and give her this latest notice does not allow Sam Oil 
to climb into her shoes and claim that it had no notice when, in 
fact, Sam's president had known for some time about the Well. BHP 
fulfilled its duty in trying to locate Hazel Robertson, and Sam 
Oil does not become the recipient of some higher duty on the part 
of BHP which would allow equity to throw out the contractual 
provisions of the Operating Agreement and permit Sam Oil to 
participate without paying 300% of the drilling and completion 
costs of the #6 Well. Further, Sam Oil has no standing to 
complain about notice to Hazel Robertson; she has never 
complained about not having been located and given notice of the 
drilling proposal. BHP has fulfilled its obligation to Hazel 
Robertson and owes nothing further to Sam Oil other than to 
properly apply revenues to the nonconsent penalty and advise Sam 
Oil at such time as the nonconsent penalty has been satisfied. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
This is a factual dispute which has been considered 
twice by the Board. There is more than ample evidence to support 
the Board's finding that Sam Oil is subject to the nonconsent 
provisions of the Unit Operating Agreement and Amendment, and 
that the working interest owners may recoup 300% of the drilling 
and completion costs of the #6 Well before Sam Oil begins 
participating in the proceeds of the #6 Well. The Board has been 
designated by the Legislature to make the kinds of findings it 
made in this case, and this Court should not revisit those facts 
unless there has been a showing of an arbitrary and capricious 
decision. The record taken as a whole does not support such a 
showing. Thus, BHP respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
Board's Orders. 
DATED December 18, 1990. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
John P. Harrington 
Alan A. Enke 
Attorneys for BHP Petroleum 
(Americas), Inc. 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF SAM OIL, 
INC., ] 
Petitioner, ; 
vs. ] 
BHP PETROLEUM (AMERICAS), 
INC., j 
Respondent. ] 
i ORDER 
i Docket No. 89-008 
i Cause No. 131-82 
This matter was heard before the Board of Oil, Gas and 
Mining at its regularly scheduled hearing at 10:00 a.m. on 
August 24, 1989 in the boardroom of the Division of Oil, Gas 
and Mining, 355 West North Temple, 3 Triad Center, Suite 350, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. The following Board Members, 
constituting a quorum, were present and participated in the 
hearing and in the decision embodied herein: 
Gregory P. Williams, Chairman 
Richard B. Larsen 
Judy F. Lever 
E. Steele Mclntyre 
Kent G. Stringham 
John M. Garr was absent from parts of the hearing and abstained 
from the decision of the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining. 
Members of the staff of the Division of Oil, Gas and 
Mining present at and participating in the hearing included: 
Dr. Dianne R. Nielson, Director 
Division of Oil, Gas and Mining 
Ronald J. Firth, Associate Director, Oil and Gas 
Division of Oil, Gas and Mining 
Barbara W. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, also participated in the hearing on behalf of 
the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 
The following appeared at the hearing: 
Steven W. Dougher.ty 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Petitioner SAM Oil, Inc. 
John P. Harrington 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent BHP Petroleum 
(Americas), Inc. 
Testimony was received from and exhibits were 
introduced on behalf of Petitioner SAM Oil, Inc. by Steven A. 
Malnar, President of SAM Oil, and Phillip Wm. Lear, Attorney at 
Law, of the law firm of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy. 
Mr. Lear was recognized by the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining as 
an oil and gas law expert in the context of this matter. 
Testimony was received from and exhibits were introduced on 
behalf of Respondent BHP Petroleum (Americas), Inc. by Jerry 
Bair, District Land Manager of BHP Petroleum (Americas), Inc. 
In addition, portions of the testimony of Daniel P. Kroop, 
formerly a landman for BHP, were read into the record. 
The Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, having considered 
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the testimony, exhibits, and evidence presented and the 
statements made by the participants at the hearing, now makes 
and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. BHP was the operator of the Roosevelt Unit #6 Well 
(the "#6 Well") and as such commenced and drilled the well. 
The well was spudded on September 11, 1983. 
2. Hazel M. Robertson ("Robertson") was the owner 
of an unleased interest in the area for the #6 Well. Prior to 
spudding, BHP contacted other working interest owners to invite 
them to participate in the #6 Well but BHP did not contact 
Robertson. 
3. Prior to the commencement of drilling the #6 Well, 
SAM Oil knew of the existence of the unleased interest of 
Robertson. 
4. SAM Oil knew prior tothe commencement of drilling 
that the #6 Well would be drilled as a Wasatch deep formation 
well. 
5. On or about September 29, 1983, SAM Oil obtained 
an oil and gas lease from Robertson to be effective as of first 
production (approximately 1949). On or about November 2, 1983, 
SAM Oil obtained an oil and gas lease from Robertson, to be 
effective as of August 29, 1983. The second lease replaced the 
first. At the time these leases were given, and prior thereto, 
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the Robertson interest had not been committed to the Roosevelt 
Unit. 
6. On or about October 6, 1983, SAM Oil wrote to 
Phillips Petroleum expressing an interest in joining the 
Roosevelt Unit. The letter did not identify particular-
acreage* Phillips Petroleum responded by stating that the 
letter had been referred to Rio Bravo as the operator. 
7. On or about October 26, 1983, Rio Bravo 
responded by letter to SAM Oil describing the procedures for 
joinder. 
8. On or about January 4, 1983, Rio Bravo sent SAM 
Oil a letter transmitting ratification and joinder documents to 
be signed by Robertson, ratification and joinder documents to 
be signed by SAM Oil, and copies of the Unit Agreement and Unit 
Operating Agreement. SAM Oil maintains that the April 27, 1983 
amendment to the Unit Operating Agreement was not included with 
these materials. BHP maintains that it was standard procedure 
to include all amendments. This amendment changes the 
so-called nonconsent penalty from 150% to 300%. 
9. The #6 Well was completed on January 6, 1984 as 
a "good" well. 
10. On or about February 15, 1984, SAM Oil mailed 
the signed ratification and joinder documents to Rio Bravo. In 
December 1984 the Bureau of Land Management approved the 
joinder effective as of June 1, 1984. 
11. BHP did not at any time request that SAM Oil pay 
-4-
a proportionate share of the drilling costs of the #6 Well, 
12. SAM Oil did not at any time tender to BHP a 
proportionate share of the drilling costs of the #6 Well. 
13. The Board finds no factual circumstances unique 
to this case which require, as a matter of equity, that SAM 
Oil's leasehold interest in the Roosevelt Unit #6 Well not be 
subject to the 300% nonconsent penalty provided in the Unit 
Operating Agreement, as amended. 
14. The #6 Well has not yet paid out 300% of the 
appropriate costs of drilling, completing and equipping the 
Well and, therefore, no proceeds are owed to SAM Oil. 
Consequently, it is not necessary to examine the costs of 
drilling, completing and equipping the #6 Well at this time or 
as part of this cause, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Due and regular notice of the time, place, and 
subject matter of this hearing in Docket No. 89-008, Cause 
No. 131-82 was given to all interested persons in accordance 
with applicable law and with the rules, practices, and orders 
of the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining pertaining to this matter. 
2. The Petition of SAM Oil, Inc. in this matter was 
properly before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining at the 
hearing, and the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining has jurisdiction 
over the matters contained therein. 
3. The Board of Oil, Gas and Mining has received and 
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duly considered adequate, substantial evidence to support its 
decision herein, and that decision is supported by such 
evidence. 
4. As a rule, under the Unit Agreement and Unit 
Operating Agreement, as amended, the lessee of an uncommitted 
interest who commits that interest to the unit subsequent to 
the commencement of the well, would be subject to the 
nonconsent penalty provided in the Unit Operating Agreement, as 
amended. However, there may be unique circumstances where, as 
a matter of equity, the general rule would not apply. The 
Board does not find such circumstances to exist in this case. 
Consequently, SAM Oil is subject to the 300% nonconsent penalty 
provided in the Unit Operating Agreement, as amended. 
5. Since SAM Oil is not presently entitled to any 
payments from BHP because of the application of the 300% 
nonconsent penalty provision, no issue exists as to whether 
sums have been improperly withheld or whether interest or 
penalties under § 40-6-9 are warranted. 
6. The Board has authority to enter the order set 
forth below. 
ORDER 
1. The Petition of SAM Oil, Inc. is hereby 
dismissed. Such dismissal is without prejudice to the right of 
SAM Oil to institute appropriate proceedings for an accounting 
of the costs of drilling, completing and equipping the #6 Well. 
2. The Board of Oil, Gas and Mining retains 
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continuing jurisdiction over all matters covered by this Order 
and over all persons affected hereby for the purpose of making 
such further orders and taking such further actions as the 
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining may deem appropriate in accordance 
with applicable laws and with the rules of the Board. 
Entered this^^^day of April, 1990. 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
illiams, Chairman 
0613G 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo— 
IN THE MATTER OF SAM OIL, INC., : ORDER 
PETITIONER, VS. BHP PETROLEUM 
(AMERICAS), INC., RESPONDENT : DOCKET NO. 89-008 
CAUSE NO. 131-82 
-—ooOoo 
This matter was heard before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining at 
its regularly scheduled hearing at 10:00 a.m. on March 22, 1990 in the 
boardroom of the Division of Oil, Qas and Mining, 355 West North Temple, 
3 Triad Center, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, Utah. The following Board 
Members, constituting a quorum, were present and participated in the 
hearing and in the decision embodied herein: 
Gregory P. Williams, Chairman 
James W. Carter 
John M. Garr 
Richard B. Larsen 
Judy F. Lever 
E. Steele Mclntyre 
Kent G. Stringham 
The following appeared at the hearing: 
Steven W. Dougherty 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
John P. Harrington 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
The petitioner has requested the Board to rehear Docket No. 89-008, 
Cause No. 131-82. The Board has considered the record from the August 
24, 1989, hearing as well as the documentation and arguments presented 
at this hearing. 
ORDER 
The Petition of SAM Oil, Inc. for rehearing is denied. 
Entered this 8th day of June, 1990. 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
illiams, Chairman 
bid 
AW/Orders 
Exhibit C 
40-6-9. Proceeds from sale of production — Payment of 
proceeds — Requirements — Proceeding on peti-
tion to determine cause of nonpayment — Reme-
dies — Penalties. 
(1) The oil and gas proceeds derived from the sale of production from any 
well producing oil, gas, or related hydrocarbons in the state shall be paid to all 
persons legally entitled to these payments commencing not later than 180 
days after the first day of the month following the date of first sale and 
thereafter not later than 30 days after the end of the calendar month within 
which payment is received by the payor for production unless other periods or 
arrangements are provided for in a valid contract with the person entitled to 
the proceeds. The payment shall be made directly to the person or persons 
entitled to the payment by the payor. The payment is considered to have been 
made upon deposit in the United States mail. 
(2) Payments shall be remitted to the person or persons entitled to proceeds 
from production annually for the aggregate of up to 12 months accumulation 
of proceeds if the total amount owed is $100 or less. 
(3) Any delay in determining any person legally entitled to an interest in 
the proceeds from production does not affect payments to all other persons 
entitled to payment. In instances where accrued payments cannot be made for 
any reason within the time limits specified in Subsection (2), the payor shall 
deposit all proceeds credited to the eventual oil and gas proceeds owner to an 
escrow account in a federally insured bank or savings and loan institution 
using a standard escrow document form which deposit shall earn interest at 
the highest rate being offered by that institution for the amount and term of 
such demand deposits. The escrow agent may commingle money received into 
escrow from any one lessee or operator, purchaser, or other party legally 
responsible for payment. Payment of principal and accrued interest from these 
accounts shall be paid by the escrow agent to all persons legally entitled to 
them within 30 days from the date of receipt by the escrow agent of final legal 
determination of entitlement to the payment. Applicable escrow fees shall be 
deducted from the payments. 
(4) Any party entitled to proceeds of production in oil and gas may file a 
petition with the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining to conduct a hearing to deter-
mine why these proceeds have not been paid. 
(5) Upon receipt of the petition the board shall set the matter for investiga-
tion and negotiation by the division within 60 days. 
(6) If the matter cannot be resolved by negotiation as of that date, the board 
may set a hearing within 30 days. If the board does not set a hearing, all 
information gathered during the investigation and negotiation shall be given 
to the petitioner who may then seek a remedy in the court system. 
(7) If, after a hearing, the board finds the payment of proceeds delay is 
without reasonable justification, it may order a complete accounting and re-
quire the proceeds and interest to be paid into an interest bearing escrow 
account and set a date not later than 90 days for final distribution. The board 
may also assess a penalty of up to 25% of the proceeds and interest at the rate 
of 1V2% per month from the date of delinquency until paid upon finding that 
the delay of payment of proceeds was known and intentional. 
(8) The penalty provisions of this chapter do not apply in the following 
instances: 
(a) the payor fails to make such payment otherwise required under this 
section in good faith reliance upon a title opinion by a licensed Utah 
attorney objecting to the lack of good and marketable title of record in the 
party claiming entitlement to payment and furnishes a copy of the opin-
ion to the party for necessary curative action; 
(b) the payor receives information which, in the payor's good faith judg-
ment, brings into question the entitlement of the person claiming the 
right to the payment to receive that payment or which has rendered 
unmarketable the title of the payment, or which may expose the payor to 
the risk of multiple liability or liability to third parties if the payment is 
made. In that event, the payor may suspend those payments otherwise 
required by this chapter or, at the request and expense of the party claim-
ing entitlement whereupon the payor's own initiative, may interplead 
such fund in the manner provided by law in order to resolve such claims 
and avoid liability under this chapter; 
(c) the total amount of oil and gas proceeds in possession of the payor 
owed to the owner thereof making claim to payment is less than $100 at 
the end of any month; or 
(d) the party entitled to payment has failed or refused to execute a 
division or transfer order acknowledging the proper interest to which the 
party claims to be entitled and setting forth the mailing address to which 
payment may be directed. 
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